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Foundational aspects of security
This Special Issue of the Journal of Computer Security focuses on foundational
aspects of security, which in recent years have helped change much of the way we
think about and approach system security. The volume features three outstanding
papers, each devoted to one of the pillars of security theory: logic, model checking
and types.
• Joshua Guttman in “Establishing and preserving protocol security goals” pro-
poses a model-theoretic approach to the verification of security properties,
where the models are executions, and the security goals are implications over
the geometric fragment of predicate logic. This methodology also leads to a new
reading of protocol refinement and transformation, and offers the possibility of
reasoning about these concepts in semantic terms.
• “Effective verification of confidentiality for multi-threaded programs”, by Tri
Ngo, Mariëlle Stoelinga and Marieke Huisman, focuses on the verification
of confidentiality properties in concurrent systems via model checking. More
specifically, it studies observational determinism (a property that ensures se-
cure information flow) in multi-threaded programs, under a given scheduler.
The latter guarantees robustness with respect to refinement attacks. Moreover,
it proposes a counter-example generation technique which allows to extract an
actual attack when the verification of a program fails.
• Finally, in “Union, intersection and refinement types and reasoning about type
disjointness for secure protocol implementations”, Michael Backes, Ca˘ta˘lin
Hrit¸cu and Matteo Maffei present a new type system for verifying the secu-
rity of cryptographic protocol implementations, where the main novelty is the
capability to check statically the disjointness of types. The increased expressiv-
ity enables the analysis of protocol classes that were previously out of reach for
the type-based approach, such as signatures of private data and encryptions of
authenticated data. The proposed system and parts of the soundness proof are
formalized in Coq.
This collection pays homage to the recent decision by the European Joint Confer-
ences on Theory and Practice of Software (ETAPS) to add a conference on security
to the confederation, and to the enthusiastic response of the security theory commu-
nity to this initiative. We believe that this alliance will be highly beneficial for all
communities involved.
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202 Preface: Foundational aspects of security
The last decades had witnessed an increasing interest in formal approaches to the
design, analysis and verification of security protocols, which had lead, on one hand,
to a proliferation of workshops and colloquia on security theory and, on the other
hand, to the decision by the ETAPS community to add security to their cluster of
interests. In 2011 the joint workshops ARSPA and WITS became the first security
event associated to ETAPS, under the name of TOSCA (Theory of Security and
Applications). In 2012 the workshops SecCo (Security Issues in Concurrency) and
FAST (Formal Aspects of Security and Trust) joined in, thus providing the critical
mass to form a new conference, which took the name of POST (Principles Of Secu-
rity and Trust). POST has been one of the ETAPS sister conferences since then.
We would like to thank all anonymous reviewers who have greatly helped us in
the production of this Special Issue.
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